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1. Introduction 
"The UN' s little k:nown watchlist is alarmingly 
arbitrary and seductive. 
lt faces a legal challenge in Europe". 
The Economist, February 2"' to 8th 2008, p. 59. 
The right to a fair hearing and e:ffective judicial review is a basic right, undisputed 
throughout Europe and embedded not only in EU-law, but also in Articles 6 and 13 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) 1 and in the national law of all European states. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 2 includes this guarantee in its 
Article 14. 
The implications of a right to a fair hearing and e:ffective judicial review in the EU 
framework, namely in the case law ofthe courts ofthe European Union, are basically 
inspired by the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECourtHR) 3• The respect for fundamental rights constitutes an integral part ofthe 
general principles of law protected by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 4• When 
safeguarding those rights, the Court - due to Article 6 EU - draws its inspiration 
from constitutional traditions common to the Member States, but always emphasizes 
on the other hand that "the international treaties for the protection of human rights 
on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories can 
supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community 
• The authors thank Anela Luc1c for her support while finishing this contribution. 
1 Entered into force 1953. 
2 Entered into force 197 6. 
3 L. ScHEEK, "The Relationship between the European Courts and Integration through 
Human Rights", Heidelberg Journal of International Law, 65, 2005, p. 837, p. 849-850, uses 
the picture ofthe Community Courts borrowing the ECHR-rights in the seventies. 
4 ECJ, 11 July 2007, case 11-70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfahr- und 
Vorratsstelle fiir Getreide und Futtermittel, ECR, p. 1125, para. 4. 
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law" 5• In its Hoechst judgement, the ECJ attributed a "particular significance" 6 to 
theECHR 7• 
According to the case law of the ECourtHR, 
People whose civil rights are affected- e. g. due to freezing orders -must, pursuant 
to Article 6(1) ECHR have access to a court in order tobe able to challenge such 
orders 8• There, they must benefit from the requirements of a fair hearing 9: 
Procedural equality 10, an adversarial process 11 and disclosure of relevant 
material 12, areasoned decision 13, and-basically-the rightto a public hearing 14 
5 ECJ, 13 December 1979, case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, ECR, 
p. 3727, para. 15; see also S. BREITENMOSER and A. HusHEER, Europarecht, vol. II, 2nd ed., 
Zürich/Basel/Genf, Schulthess, 2002, p. 876, ECHR as aRechtserkenntnisquelle, no. 1767. 
6 ECJ, 21 September 1989, joined cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst, ECR, p. 2859, 
para. 13. 
7 See e. g. also the joint declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission concerning the protection of fundamental rights and the European Charter of 
Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms, 5 April 1977, OJ, no. C 103, 1977, p. !; especially 
with regard toArticle 6 ECHR also ECJ, 17 December 1998, case C-185/95 P,Baustahlgewebe 
GmbH, ECR, p. I-8417, parii, 29. 
8 ECourtHR, 21 February 1975, Golder v. United Kingdom, Series A 18, para. 28-36; 
however, the right ofaccess to court is not absolute, see ECourtHR, 28 May 1985, Ashingdane 
v. United Kingdom, no. 8225/78, Series A 93, para. 57. 
9 The requirements of a fair hearing pursuant to Article 6(1) ECHR have to be. fulfilled in 
criminal proceedings, too. In addition, Article 6(2)-(3) ECHR is applicable only in the criminal 
sphere. See C. GRABENWARTER, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 2nd ed., München, C.H. 
Beck, 2005, p. 283, no. 4. 
10 The egalite d' armes requires a fair balance between the parties: "Bach partY must be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case under conditions that do not place them 
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their opponent or opponents", ECourtHR, 27 April 2004, Gorraiz 
Lizarraga and Others v. Spain, Reports of Judgements and Decisions 2004-III, para. 56. 
11 According to ECourtHR, 26 June 1993, Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, no. 12952/87, Series A 
262, para. 63, this refers to "the opportunity for the parties to have knowledge of and comment 
on the observations filed or evidence adduced by the other paftY". 
12 The material must be available to both parties; see for the evidence in the criminal sphere 
ECourtHR, 16 February 2000, Rowe and Davis v. United Kingdom, no. 28901/95, Reports of 
Judgements and Decisions 2000-II, para. 60. 
13 ECourtHR, 19 April 1994, Van de Hurk v. Netherlands, no. 16034/90, Series A 288, 
para. 61; nota however, that the entitlement to disclosure ofrelevant evidence is not absolute: 
In Rowe and Davis v. United Kingdom, supra note 12, the ECourtHR recognized in para. 65 that 
there can be restrictions due to competing interests if these restrictions are strictly necessary. 
14 Accordingto ECourtHR, 12November2002,Sa/omonssonv. Sweden,no.38978/97, http:// 
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=l&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=38978/ 
97%20%7C%2038978/97&sessionid=5755885&skin=hudoc-fr (checked 29 February 2008), 
para. 34, "public" inArticle 6(1) ECHR implies "oral"; however, the guarantee is not seen tobe 
absolute in a sense that any proceeding without the presence ofthe individual concerned leads 
to a violation ofthe ECHR, see in this context e. g. ECourtHR, 21 September 1993, Kremzow 
v. Austria, no. 12350/86, Series A268-B, para. 63. 
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and effective participation 15• The ECHR requires an independent and impartial 
tribunal 16 established by law which holds public hearings 17 and pronounces 
its judgements publicly 18 within a reasonable time 19• At least once, a court 
fulfilling these requirements has to be able to decide on the merits of the case, 
which implies the füll review of the questions of fact and of law, including also 
an examination of proportionality 20• Tue court proceedings have tobe effective 
too, which means that the judgements passed in accordance with the ECHR have 
tobe executed 21 • 
In addition, the listed person enjoys the specific guarantees pursuant to Article 6(2) 
and (3) ECHR ifthe listing falls within the ECourtHR's autonomous definition of 
a "criminal offence" 22• 
Finally, Article 13 ECHR provides an effective remedy before anational authority 
to every applicant who can show an arguable claim tobe the victim of a violation 
ofthe rights guaranteed in the ECHR 23• 
The current UN-sanctioning system of freezing, seizure and confiscation of 
(alleged) terrorists' money based on Security Council Resolutions 24 raises new 
questions with regard to the implications of the right to a fair hearing. 
Tue sanctions follow the rationale of "starving the terrorists of money" 25 and 
have to be seen in the context that the UN, since the 1990s, has tried to use its 
15 See for this aspect under the criminal sphere e. g. ECourtHR, 16 December 
1999, T. v. United Kingdom, no. 24724/94, ht1p://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view. 
asp?item=l&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=24724/94&sessionid=5857573&skin=hudoc-
fr (checked 29 February), para 83. 
16 See e. g. ECourtHR, 26 February 2002, Morris v. United Kingdom, no. 38784/97, 
Reports of Judgements and Decisions 2002-I, para. 58. 
17 Article 6(1) ECHR contains a !ist of exceptions. 
18 See e. g. ECourtHR, 8 December 1983, Pretto and others v. ltaly, no. 7984/77, Series 
A 71, para. 20-28, where the ECourtHR stated, that the judgement did not necessarily have to 
be read out aloud. 
19 See e. g. ECourtHR, 26 September 1996, Zappia v. ltaly, no. 24295/94, Reports 1996-
rv, para. 23. 
20 ECourtHR, 23 June 1981, Le Campte and others v. Belgium, nos. 6878/75 and 7238/75, 
Series A 43, para. 51; A. PETERS, Einführung in die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 
München, C.H. Beck, 2003, p. 115. 
21 ECourtHR, 7 Mai 2002, Bourdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, Reports of Judgements and 
Decisions 2002-III, para. 34. 
22 See the [eading case ECourtHR, 8 June 1976, Engel and others v. Netherlands, Series 
A 22, para. 82. 
23 See e. g. ECourtHR, 6 April 2000, Athanassoglou v. Switzerland, Reports of Judgements 
and Decisions 2000-Iv, para. 58; ECourtHR, 28 October i999, Wille v. Liechtenstein, no. 
28396/95, Reports of Judgements and Decisions 1999-VII, para. 75. 
24 E. g. UN Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1526 (2004), 
1617 (2005), 1730 (2006). 
25 Tue 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, l'' authorized ed., 2005, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdfi' 
fullreport.pdf(checked 29 February), p. 381. 
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sanctions as selectively as possible, labelling them therefore as "smart" or "targeted" 
sanctions. The target is not a State and its population but selected people or sectors of 
the economy 26• 
At the heart of the smart sanctions system is blacklisting particular individuals and 
entities 27• People considered tobe involved with terrorist activities are listed and thus 
sanctioned. Targeted sanctions may generally include travel bans, arrns embargoes, or 
financial sanctions such as the freezing of assets 28• 
In recent judgements, European courts - supranational, international and national 
- had to deal with the question whether UN-sanctions can be reviewed with regard to 
the pertinent guarantees of fundamental rights, especially the right to a fair hearing. 
This contributiol). will firstly summarize the relevant procedures oflisting and de-
listing at UN and EU/EC levels (2), and secondly give an overview ofthe European 
jurisprudence commenting on the possibility of a legal control of the listing measures 
(3). The second part will focus on CFI (A) and ECJ (B) judgments and then on some 
decisions given in other fora (C). Finally it will analyse the status quo and broach 
possible ways to extend the individual's protection by fundamental rights (4). 
2. The UN and EU/EC freezing, seizure and confiscation regime 
A. Listing, the procedure 
In the Community, there are two ways to list a person - either the UN or the 
EU/EC specifies the person by name in concreto. This naming, by either the UN or 
the EU/EC, proved to be crucial for the scope of jurisdiction claimed by the courts 
ofthe EU 29• The ECJ's recent Kadi judgement 30 harrnonised the two areas de facto 
with regard to legal protection - however, at the moment it remains at least dubious 
whether there will be a total parallelism between the two scenarios 3 t 
1. First scenario: UN-Usting 
In the first scenario discussed here, the UN itself circumscribes the names of the 
people to be listed. This approach was chosen for the UN Resolutions directed against 
26 L. V AN DEN HmuK, "The Security Council's Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need 
of Better Protection of the Individual", Leiden Journal of International Law, 20, 2007, 
p. 797-798. 
27 P. FITZGERALD, "Managing "Smart Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely", N= England 
Law Revi=, 36, 2002, p. 957-960. 
28 L. VAN DEN HERJK, op. cit., p. 798. 
29 S. BARTELT and H. ZEITLER, "Intelligente Sanktionen zur Terrorismusbekämpfung in der 
EU", EuZW, 23, 2003, p. 712 -713; and F. MEYER and J. MAcKE, "Rechtliche Auswirkungen der 
Terroristenlisten im deutschen Recht", HRRS Strafrecht, p. 445-446, http://www.hrr-strafrecht. 
de/hrr/archiv/07-12/index.php?sz=6 ( checked 29 Febmary 2008). · 
30 ECJ, 3 September 2008, joined cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and 
Al Barakaat International Foundation, not yet reported. 
31 This harmonisation applies only for the EU/EC - and not necessarily for other States, 
e. g. Switzerland, where the two scenarios mutatis mutandis still differ when it comes to legal 
protection, see in extenso infra. 
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Osama bin Laden, the members of Al-Qaida, the Taliban and everyone associated 
with them 32• 
Tue task of drawing up a list with the names to be listed is trusted to a Sanctions 
Committee 33, a subsidiary organ of the Securiiy Council in accordance with Article 
29 UN-Charter 34. Tue procedure to follow is contained in the Guidelines of the 
Committee for the conduct of its work 35• Tue Sanctions Committee consists of all 
UN-members and makes its decisions by consensus 36• Tue Member States propose, 
on the basis of information provided by their intelligence apparatus 37, the names 
which have to be listed. Due to the preventive nature of the sanctions 38, neither a 
criminal charge nor a conviction is compulsory for an inclusion 39• The Guidelines 
enumerate in no. 6 (d) the information which should be presented by the proposing 
member. However, Articles 12 and 14 UN Resolution 1822 (2008) oblige the Member 
States to provide the Committee with a detailed statement of case 40• 
Ifthere is no objection from the other Member States within five days, the name 
will be listed 41 • 
After the listing, the State where the listed person is believed to be located and 
the State ofwhich he is anational, is called upon to take reasonable steps according 
to its domestic laws and practices to notify or inform the individual concemed about 
the listing, its consequences and the procedure conceming de-listing. The State must 
also provide him with a copy of the publicly releasable portion of the statement of 
case 42• The Member States themselves are empowered "to identify the parts of the 
statement of case that may be publicly released" 43 • According to Article 13 ofUN 
32 UN Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 
1730 (2006), 1735 (2006); see for the concemed groups e. g. Article 2 in initio UN Resolution 
1390. 
33 Article 6 UN Resolution 1267 (1999); Article 2 UN Resolution 1390 (2002). 
34 M. KoTZUR, "Eine Bewährungsprobe für die Europäische Grundrechtsgemeinschaft/ Zur 
Entscheidung des EuG in der Rs. Yusufu. a. gegen Rat", EuGRZ, 2006, p. 19-20; S. ScHMAHL, 
"Effektiver Rechtsschutz gegen "targeted sanctions" des UN-Sicherheitsrats?", EuR, 4, 2006, 
p. 566. 
35 Adopted 7 November 2002, last changed on 12 February 2007, see: http://www.un.org/ 
sc/cornmittees/1267 /pdfl1267 _guidelines.pdf ( checked 29 February 2008), quoted henceforth 
as "Guidelines". 
36 Guidelines, nos. 2(a) and 4(a). 
37 S. ScHMAHL, op. cit., p. 566. 
38 Guidelines, no. 6( c ). 
39 Jbid. 
40 See the details inArticle 4 UN Resolution 1735 (2006); see also Articles 2 UN Resolution 
1617 (2005) and 2 UN Resolution 1822 (2008) referring to the terms "associated with". 
41 Guidelines, nos. 6(f) and 4(b ); see the consolidated list online: http://www.un.org/sc/ 
committees/1267 /pdflconsolidatedlist.pdf ( checked 29 February 2008). 
42 Articles 11 UN Resolution 1735 (2006) and 17 UN Resolution 1822 (2008); Guide!ines, 
no. 6(h). 
43 Artic!es 6 UN Resolution 1735 (2006) and 12 UN Resolution 1822 (2008). 
168 LE CONTRÖLE JURIDICT!ONNEL DANS L'ESPACE PENAL 
Resolution 1822 (2008), the Sanctions Committee is directed to publish on its website 
a "narrative summary of reasons" for the listing 44• 
At the European level, the mentioned Resolutions were implemented by the 
enactment of Common Position 2002/402/CFSP and Regulation no. 881/2002. The 
implementation by EU and EC - neither of them being members of the UN - are in 
accordance with the UN-Charter, which in its Article 48 (2) allows the Member States 
to use international agencies to carry out the decisions of the Security Council and its 
subsidiary organs. 
The ,EU/EC adopts precisely the list established by the Sanctions Committee. 
Basically, there is neither a European margin of appreciation to omit names listed by 
the UN nor the competence in favour of the EU/EC to add other names 45• However, 
according to the recent Kadi judgement of the ECJ 46, the Community authorities are 
bound to provide the listed person with a statement of reasons in order to comply with 
the fundamental rights of the Community 47 and - at least in theory - there seems to 
be a possible competence of the EU/EC-under certain conditions in certain cases - to 
de-list people from the European Regulation implementing the UN-Resolution 48• 
2. Second scenario: European listing 
In the second scenario, UN-Member States (all EU members are members of 
the UN) are given the authority to decide on their own whose name is added to a 
terrorist-list according to which sanctions are imposed. This is the approach chosen 
by UN Resolution 1373 (2001) directed against the financing ofterrorism in general, 
which only states the sanctions in abstracto, leaving their personal application to the 
Member States. There are two levels tobe distinguished: national and European 49• 
Starting point is, pursuant toArticle 1 ( 4) Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, a decision 
with regard to investigations or prosecution due to delinquency referring to terrorism 
or a condemnation because of such acts, made by a competent national authority, in 
principle judicial. The decision conceniing investigations or prosecution has to be 
based on serious and credible evidence or clues. Subsequently, the Council decides 
unanimously if a name is listed 50• lt considers the precise information or material in 
the pertinent file indicating that the necessary decision has been taken on the domestic 
level. In this context, the Council does not act under circumscribed powers; it is not 
o bliged to !ist every person or entity, even if there is a decision according to Article 1 ( 4) 
44 According to Article 12 UN Resolution 1822 (2008), the decision ofthe Member States 
with regard to the question which part of the pertinent information can be released applies also 
to this context. 
45 Article 2(1) Regulation no. 881/2002; see also Article 8 UN Resolution 1822 (2008). 
46 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30. 
47 Jbid., para. 333-371. 
"' See for this thesis infra. 
49 CFI, 12 December 2006, case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple 
d'Iran (OMPI), ECR, p. II-4665, para. 117; 11 July 2007, case T-47/03, Sison, ECR, p. II-2047, 
para. 164. 
50 Article 2 (3) in initio Regulation no. 2580/2001. 
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Common Position 2001/931/CFSP 51 • Article 1 (5) Common Position 2001/931/CFSP 
obliges the Council to list the pertinent names in a sufficiently detailed way to ensure 
their effective identification. 
As a reaction to the CFI's OMPI judgement 52, the rights ofthe listed people after 
their designation were enforced in 2006 53 • 
3. Consequence: The listed person 's rights 
Thus, in neither of the two systems, the listed individual or entity is informed ex 
ante about the current procedure which may lead to a listing. The concemed individuals 
are not present at the deliberation of the competent authorities leading to the listing 
either and are, as a result, unable to comment on the facts adducted against them. 
If the listed names are fixed by the UN, the listed person is informed after the 
designation about the listing and given a copy ofthe publicly releasable portion ofthe 
statement of case 54, which is also published online 55• Thus, the insight possible into 
the reasons adducted by the designated State is, apparently, dependent on the will of 
the latter. Also the ECJ requires, for the implementation ofthe UN Resolution on the 
Community level, a statement of reasons ex post 56• 
B. De-listing, the procedure 
Delisting is determined by the UN- or EU/EC legal frameworkjust as the listing 
is. 
1. First scenario: UN de-listing 
The list established by the UN can only be changed according to no. 8 of the 
Guidelines in combination with UN Resolutions 1822 (2008) and 1730 (2006). No. 
8(b) of the Guidelines states the two ways for a listed person to request de-listing: 
the petitioner can submit the request through either the UN focal point or the State 
of residence or citizenship 57• The UN-focal point was established by UN Resolution 
1730 (2006); it serves as aforum for consultations for the concemed States, which had 
designated the listed person in the past and the States of residence or citizenship, in 
order to be able to make a suggestion to the Sanctions Committee 58 . 
51 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 145. 
52 Jbid.; see in this context infra. 
53 Especially information ex post about the listing; see also Fight against terrorist financing 
- Six monthly report, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 5 October 2007, n° 11948/2/07 REV 2, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdfi'en/07 /stl l/stl 1948-re02.en07 .pdf( checked 29 F ebruary 
2008). 
· 54 Articles 10 and 11 UN Resolution 1735 (2006). 
55 Article 13 UN Resolution 1822 (2008). 
56 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30; see in extenso infra. 
57 See for the second possibility infra; see in general with regard to the position of the State 
in the de-listing procedure S. EYMANN, "Urteilsanmerknng zu BGE 133 II 450", 2, AJP, 2008, 
p. 244 and p. 250-251; see also Article 20 UN Resolution 1822 (2008).· 
58 D. FRANK, "UNO-Sanktionen gegen Terrorismus und Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK.)", in S. BREITENMOSER, B. EHRENZELLER, M. SAssöu, 
W. STOFFEL and B. WAGNER PFEIFER (ed.), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 
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In both procedures, the Committee finally decides on the de-listing by consensus. 
Article 14 UN Resolution 1735 (2006) gives examples of criteria which may be 
considered by the Committee while deciding on a de-listing. UN Resolution 1822 
(2008) brings about new approaches with regard to a review of the Consolidated List 
without a request of the listed person 59• 
If a consensus is not reached by the Committee, the decision is made by the 
Security Council 60• 
2. Second scenario: European de-Usting 
In the case of a list established pursuant to UN Resolution 1373, Article 1(6) 
Common Position 2001/931 requires a review by the Council at least once every six 
months. lt must be ensured that reasons exist for keeping the names listed. 
However, again in reaction to the CFI's OMPI judgement 61, there has been a 
certain consolidation of the listed person's rights 62 
3. Consequence: The listed person s rights 
The current sanctioning systems infringe upon individual rights - without 
an existing effective judicial review or respecting the presumption of innocence 
sufliciently. 
Tue establishment of the focal point in the UN framework does not solve this 
problem, as long as the same UN committee decides on the listing as well as on the 
de-listing, scilicet the Sanctions Committee 63 • Such an arrangement cannot grant an 
effective remedy through an independent instance for review. Furtherrnore, the fact 
that in practice the listed person has to prove his or her innocence in order to be de-
listed puts the presumption of innocence at risk 64 - to name in the limited frame of 
this contribution only two fairly obvious deficiencies. 
However, the recent intervention of the ECJ with its Kadi judgement 65 obliges 
the Community authorities to provide the listed people with a statement of reasons 
as quickly as possible a:fter their names have been added to the European Regulation 
adopting the UN-Resolution 66• Tue existence of such an obligation is crucial for a 
listed person in order to achieve a de-listing procedure successfully. 
Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber, 2007, p. 237, p. 245-246, note 36; F. MEYER and J. MACKE, 
op. cit., p. 453. 
59 Articles 22, 25, 26 UN Resolution 1822 (2008). 
60 No. 8(f) of the Guidelines. 
61 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49. 
62 See also Fight against terrorist-financing - Six monthly report, supra note 53, no. 11, 
about the possibility to submit a request, together with supporting documentation, that the listing 
of the pertinent name is reconsidered and also about the competence of the working party. 
63 L. V AN DEN RERIK, op. cit., p. 805, calls "political" the de-listing procedure also after the 
establishment ofthe focal point, see also 807 in the same publication. 
64 D. FRANK, op. cit., p. 245-246, note 36. 
65 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30. 
66 Ibid., para. 336. 
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On the European level, even though one cannot detect an individual legal remedy 
to reach a de-listing in Regulation no. 2580/2001, there exists in theory the possibility 
of an action for annulment pursuant to Article 230( 4) EC 67• The courts however will 
have to take the chance and practice jurisdiction in a suflicient way. 
Interesting enough, on the whole, it appears that the recent efforts 68 made to 
improve the situation oflisted people and entities refer more to the listing than to the 
de-listing procedure 69• 
3. EU/EC case-law with regard to the judicial review of listing measures 
Given the EU/EC human rights acquis with regard to the right to a fair hearing and 
effective judicial review 70 one of the most challenging questions in recent European 
discussions onjurisdiction has been: what can the courts in Europe do with regard to 
the UN-sanctions - how can they control them and to what extent? Subsequeiltly, in 
the main part of this contribution, there is an overview of crucial judgements in the 
context of listing, de-listing and their judicial review. lt focuses on the right to a fair 
hearing and the procedural rights oflisted people and entities, which have beeh at the 
heart of - quite different - judgements of CFI (A) and the ECJ (B) on the one hand, 
and of otherfora (C) on the other. 
A. The Court of First Instance (CFI) 
The crucial question regards how the CFI uses the Communities' fundamental 
rights - which are substantially influenced by the guarantees enshrined in the ECHR 
and the ECourtHR's pertinent case law - when it has to control a terrorist listing. 
1. UN-listings 71 
a. Scope of the jurisdiction: Limitation due to the primacy of the UN-law 
In the well-known judgements Yusuf and Kadi 72 the CFI examined - inter alia 
- an action für annulment according to Article 230( 4) EC directed against Regulation 
no. 881/2002, which contains in its annex the applicants' names adopting the listing 
of the Sanctions Committee. 
The grounds of annulment submitted by the applicants referred to breaches of the 
right to a fair hearing, the right to respect for property, the principle of proportionality 
and the right to effective judicial review. 
The Court first had to clarify the relationship between the UN legal system and 
the domestic or Community legal order and commented also on the extent to which 
the exercise by the Community and its Member States of their powers is bound 
by UN Resolutions of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VIl of the UN-
67 F. MEYER and J. MAcKE, op. cit., p. 454. 
68 See for the UN level, L. V AN DEN RERIK, op. cit., p. 803-805. 
69 Ibid., p. 805. 
70 As circumscribed supra. 
71 See for this scenario supra. 
72 CFI, 21 September 2005, case T-315/01, Kadi, ECR, p. II-3649; 21 September 2005, 
case T-306/01, Yusuf, ECR, p. II-3533; however, the ECJ set aside the CFI's judgement, see in 
extenso infra. 
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Charter: The CFI stated a total primacy of the UN-Charter; towards the domestic 
law of the EC-Member States, the international treaty law and especially also the 
TEC 73 • In casu, when enacting Regulation no. 881/2002, the EC-institutions had 
acted under circumscribed powers, with the result that they had no autonomous -
discretion. Subsequently, the CFI defined the scope of its jurisdiction: a review of the 
internal lawfulness of the contested Regulation would imply that the Court considers, 
indirectly, the lawfulness ofthe UN-Resolutions implemented by the Regulation. In 
the present cases, the origin of the illegality alleged by the applicants would have to 
be sought not in the adoption of the contested regulation but in the UN Resolutions 
of the Security Council. Such a review not being compatible with the primacy of the 
UN-law, the Court recognised a limitation of its own jurisdiction. The only exception 
had, in its view, to be made in favour of a control whether the contested Regulation 
adopting the UN-enactments is in accordance with the jus cogens "understood as a 
body ofhigher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of international 
law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation is 
possible" 74• 
b. The accordance of UN-sanctions with jus cogens 
Exercising the jus cogens-control, the CFI stated that the listing by the Sanctions 
Committee did not infringe upon guarantees classified asjus cogens. 
As to the alleged breach of the right to respect for property and of the principle 
of proportionality 75, the CFI emphasised the existence of an express provision 
of possible exemptions and derogations 76 and the fact that the deprivation of 
the right to property had not been arbitrary. In addition, the contested measures 
did not affect the very substance of the right to property, but only its use. Finally, 
the overall system of sanctions was reviewed periodically and there was a UN-
procedure of de-listing. 
The right to be heard 77 by the EC institutions according to the Community law 
could not apply in such circumstances as in the present case, where a hearing 
could in no way lead the institution to review its position 78• On the other hand, 
the lack of a hearing by the Sanctions Committee did not constitute a violation of 
jus cogens-guarantees either. In the Court's view, the fundamental rights do not 
require the communication of the facts and evidence adducted against the listed 
person if the contested measure restricts only temporarily the availability of the 
property 79• 
73 CFI, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 176-208; Yusuj, supra note 72, para. 226-259; the CFI 
referred especially to Article 307 EC. 
74 CFI, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 226; Yusuf, supra note 72, para. 277. 
75 CFI, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 234-252; only concerning to make use of one's property 
see CFI, Yusuf, supra note 72, para. 285-303. 
76 Article 2(a) Regulation 881/2002. 
77 According to the terminology in CFI, Kadi judgment, supra note 72; slightly different 
in Yusuf, supra note 72: "right to a fair hearing". 
78 CFI, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 258; Yusuf, supra note 72, para. 328. 
79 CFI, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 274; CFI, Yusuf, supra note 72, para. 320. 
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Dealing with the alleged breach of the right to effective Judicial review 80, the CFI 
stated that it was competent to control the lawfulness ofthe contested regulation 
with regard to observance by the EC-institutions of the rules of jurisdiction and 
the rules of extemal lawfulness and the essential procedural requirements which 
bind their actions. Furthermore, the Court could control the implementation of 
the UN-Resolution by an· EC-Regulation under the aspect of procedural and 
substantive appropriateness, intemal consistency and proportionality 8t. 
However, it could not be for the Court to review indirectly whether the Security 
Council's Resolutions are themselves compatible with the fundamental rights of 
the Community, whether there is an error of assessment of the facts and evidence 
relied upon by the Security Council or of the appropriateness and proportionality 
of the measures. In this area, the applicant has had no judicial remedy. In the 
Court's view, such a lacuna in the judicial protection is not in itself contrary to Jus 
cogens, since the right of access to courts is not absolute and there exists at least 
the de-listing procedure before the Sanctions Committee 82• 
As to a pertinent reproach, the Court could not detect in the freezing measures 
an inhuman or degrading treatment - neither concerning the purpose, nor the 
object 83 • 
The Court admits, that the freezing of funds is a particularly drastic measure, 
which is capable of preventing the concerned person from leading a normal 
social life and forces him/her to be dependent upon public financial assistance. 
However, the importance of the goals pursued by the UN with its sanctions, 
scilicet the prevention of terrorist attacks, justifies even negative consequences 
being of a substantial nature for certain operators. As to the applicant's situation 
in the present case, in the Court's view, a satisfactory personal, family and social 
life has been possible 84• 
Generally, according to the Court, there is no Jus cogens-guarantee concerning the 
respect for private and family life violated due to the sanctions in the absence of 
an arbitrary interference with the exercise ofthose rights 85 
c. Contra! of the legal basis of Regulation no. 881/2002 
According to the Court's assessment in the cases Yusuf and Kadi 86, Articles 60, 
301 and 308 EC together constitute a suflicient legal basis for the enactment of 
Regulation no. 881/2002. 
80 According to the terminology in CF!, Kadi, supra note 72; slightly different in Yusuf, 
supra note 72: "effective judicial remedy". 
81 CF!, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 279; CF!, Yusuf, supra note 72, para. 335. 
82 CF!, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 283-290; more detailed CFI, 12 July 2006, Hassan, case 
T-49/04, ECR, p. II-2139, para. 104-125, appeal C-399/06. 
83 CFI, 12 July 2006, case T-253/02, Ayadi, ECR, p. II-2139, para. 120; appeal C-403/06. 
84 CFI, Ayadi, supra note 83, para. 121-126; Hassan, supra note 82, para. 97-102. 
85 CF!, Hassan, supra note 82, para.126-127. 
86 CF!, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 87-135; Yusuf, supra note 72, para.125-171. 
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In its Ayadi judgement 87, the CFI refused to challenge the competence of the 
Community with respect to the principle of subsidiarity. 
d Exceptions according to Article 2a Regulation 881/2002 88 
In the recentAyadi judgment 89, the CFI circumscribed its competence conceming 
Article 2a Regulation 881/2002. Due to its humanitarian objective, Artic!e 2a must not 
be interpreted strictly. lt was for the national authorities having the best overview over 
the circumstances of each case, to decide whether derogation can be permitted. If the 
national authority refused an exception without regard to the listed person's needs and 
without consulting the Sanctions Committee, this would constitute a misinterpretation 
or misapplication ofRegulation no. 881/2002. 
e. Obligations of the EU Member States in the de-listing procedure 
Regarding the right of the individual, according toArticle 8( a )-( c) of the Guidelines, 
to present a request to the Sanctions Committee for review of his case through the 
State of residence or citizenship, the Court pointed out in the Ayadi judgement 90, 
that EU Member States are bound to observe the fundamental rights protected by the 
Community-law when examining such a request. 
2. European listings 91 
a. Scope of the jurisdiction: Full jurisdiction 
On the other hand, a!ready according to the CFI, the Court's possibilities are more 
extensive if it is the EU/EC itself that determines which names are listed. When this 
is the case, the legal review is not limited to the jus cogens, but the listed people are 
protected thoroughly by the fundamental rights guaranteed by Community law. 
Tue CFI has controlled in recent judgements - as e. g. in the matters OMPI 92, 
Al-Aqsa 93 and Sison 94 - the listing by means of Council Decisions 95 implementing 
Article 2(3) ofRegulation no. 2580/2001. 
Tue pertinent UN Resolution 1373 (2001) does not specify individually the 
names to be listed. According to the Court, this is a task of the EC, which had to act 
in accordance with the rules of its own legal order. Subsequently, the CFI analysed 
the applicants' supranational listing procedure with regard to the respect of the 
87 CFI, Ayadi, supra note 83, para. 105-113. 
88 Inserted by Article 1 Regulation 561/2003. 
89 CFI, Ayadi, supra note 83, para. 130, 132. 
90 Ibid., para. 144-152; see also CFI, Hassan, supra note 82, para. 114-121 andin the 
sarne sense CFI, Kadi, supra note 72, no. 270; nota howeverNo. 8(c) ofthe Guidelines in the 
context of the possibility to submit a request for de-listing through the focal point, which has 
been established after the mentioned judgements. 
91 See for this scenario supra. 
92 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49. 
93 CFI, 11 July 2007, case T-327/03, Al-Aqsa, ECR, p. II-79. 
94 CFI, Sison, supra note 49. 
95 Council Decisions 2002/334/EC and 2002/848/EC. 
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fundamentalrights ofthe Community and stated several violations96• The requirements 
were defined as follows: 
Rights of the defence 97 (notification of the evidence adducted and hearing): 
according to the CFI, the right to a fair hearing has a relatively limited purpose in 
the present matter 98• 
Firstly, as to the initial decision to freeze funds, the evidence adducted against the 
party concemed 99 has, in the Court's view, to be notified to the listed person as 
quickly as possible, either together with or as soon as possible after the decision. 
The only exception to be made from these principles referred to overriding 
considerations conceming the security of the Community or its Member States or 
the conduct oftheir international relations 100• However, the right to a fair hearing 
did not require that the evidence be presented to the party or that there is a hearing 
before the first listing. Tue Court justified this restriction with the necessity of a 
"surprise effect" and an immediate application ofthe initial freezing decision. An 
automatic hearing after the first listing was not required either, since the parties 
concemed have the possibility ofbringing an action before the CFI 101 • As to the 
scope of the right to a fair hearing, the parties' possibilities to comment on the 
domestic decision according to Common Position 2001/931 were lirhlted: provided 
the mentioned decision has been enacted by a competent national authority, the 
right to a fair hearing pursuant to Community law does not require a repeated 
opportunity for the parties to express their views on the appropriateness and well-
foundedness of the decision. There was no obligation for the Council either, to 
decide whether the national proceedings leading to the decision comply with the 
national norms or whether the national procedure respects the fundamental rights. 
This was an exclusive power ofthe competent national courts and the ECourtHR. 
Furthermore, it was not necessary that the listed party expresses his or her views 
conceming the existence of "serious and credible evidence or clues" pursuant to 
Article 1(4) Common Position 2001/931. The CFI bases this argument on the 
principle of sincere cooperation according to Article 10 EC 102 
96 However, the applicants in the OMPI- and Sison-case have been re-listed again after the 
Council had improved the relevant procedures and especially provided the newly listed people 
with a statement of reasons, see F. MEYER and J. MACKE, op. cit.; critical B. HAYEs, "Statewatch 
Analysis, "Terrorist lists" still above the law", 2007, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/ 
aug/proscription.pdf ( checked 29 February 2008). 
97 According to the terrninology in CFI Sison case, supra note 49; slightly different in CFI 
0 MP I, supra note 49: "right to a fair hearing". 
98 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 126; CFI, Sison, supra note 49, para. 173. 
99 Specific information or material in the file which indicates that a decision pursuant 
to Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 has been taken in respect of it by a competent 
authority of a Member State and new material communicated to the Council by representatives 
of the Member States which has not been considered by the competent national authority; CFI, 
OMPJ, supra note 49, para. 126. 
10° CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 137; Sison, supra note 49, para. 184. 
101 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 128-130; Sison, supra note 49, para. i75-177. 
102 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 121-122; Sison, supra note 49, para. 168-169. 
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Secondly, the subsequent decisions affirming the initial freezing had tobe preceded 
by the possibility of a hearing and the notification of new evidence. Since the 
funds were already frozen by the initial decision, the argument conceming the 
surprise e:ffect was not pertinent in this context 103• 
Obligation to state reasons: the substantiation had to refer to the statutory 
conditions of the application of Regulation 2580/2001 and the reasons why the 
Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that the measure in casu has 
to be adopted. Tue Council had to state the matters of fact and law that constitute 
the legal basis of its decision 104• · 
Tue only possible exceptions referred to overriding considerations conceming 
the security of the Community and its Member States or the conduct of their 
international relations 105• 
Right to ejfective judicial protection: this right grants the listed person the right to 
bring an action according to Article 230( 4) EC before the Court against a decision 
to freeze his or her funds 106• 
The Court examined whether the legal conditions for the application ofRegulation 
2580/2001 pursuanttoArticle 2(3) in combination with 1(4) and 1(6) ofCommon 
Position 2001/931 were met. Due to the broad discretion enjoyed by the Council 
when adopting economic and financial sanctions on the basis of Articles 60, 301 
and 308 EC, the Court's jurisdiction is lirnited. lt may control compliance with the 
rules goveming procedure and the statement of reasons, the material accurateness 
of the facts and the absence of manifest errors of assessment of the facts or misuse 
ofpower 107• 
Tue CFI called this review all the more imperative, because it was the only 
procedural safeguard in order to strike a fair balance between the need to combat 
international terrorism and the ptotection of fundamental rights. An objection based 
on the allegedly secret nature of the evidence and information must be barred 108• 
b. Obligations of the EU Member States in the listing procedure 
In its OMPI judgement 109, the Court emphasised that in the first place, the right 
to a fair hearing had to be respected in the national procedure, in which the competent 
national authority adopts the decision according to Article 1 ( 4) of Common Position 
2001/931. 
103 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 131; CFI, Sison, supra note 49, para. 172. 
104 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 146 and 143; Sison, supra note 49, para. 190-l93;Al-
Aqsa, supra note 92, para. 54, slightly different in the structure ofthe judgement. 
105 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 151; Sison, supranote 49, para. 198. 
106 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 152; Sison, supra note 49, para. 199. 
107 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 154 and 159; Sison, supra note 49, para. 201 and 
206. 
108 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 156; Sison, supra note 49, para. 202. 
109 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 119. 
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c. Right to be heard before the enactment of a Regulation 
Although the right tobe heard could not be extended to the context of a Community 
legislative process leading to a general application, a Regulation listing names was 
not thoroughly of a legislative nature. The Court stated in the OMPI judgement uo, 
that apart from the Regulation's general application, it was of direct and individual 
concem to the listed individuals and entities. Therefore, the right to a fair hearing must 
be respected in this context. 
d. Judicial protection against the listing by Common Positions ur 
According to the case law conceming the CFI's scope of jurisdiction under 
the EU Treaty, an action for annulment uz or damages 113 can only be directed 
against a Common Position if it refers to an alleged violation of the Community's 
competences. 
B. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
1. UN-listings 
In its judicial follow-up with regard to the CFI's Kadi judgement u4, the ECJ 
shed a different light on possible solutions for the problem of exercising control over 
terrorist listing in interdependent, but still independent legal frameworks. 
a. Scope of jurisdiction 
The ECJ refused to follow the CFI's concept of a limitation of jurisdiction 
when it comes to reviewing an EC-Regulation adopting a UN-Resolution already 
specifying the names to be listed - and reversed, hence, the Kadi judgement of the 
lower instance 115• With this judgement, the ECJ fell into line with the opinion of his 
Advocate General who had suggested to abandon the CFl's jus cogens-approach, in 
his view especially, because Article 307 EC could not "render the contested Regulation 
exempt from judicial review" 116• 
The ECJ, on its part, emphasised that international agreements cannot affect the 
constitutional principles ofthe TEC, especially the requirement that all Community-
acts have to be compatible with the human rights 117• The EC was based on the rule 
of law and disposes of an autonomous legal system us_ Tue ECJ, in the complete 
system of legal remedies and procedures and as a crucial constitutional guarantee 
in the Community, has to review the legality of acts of the institutions. Tue 
11° CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 96-98. 
111 See for the ECJ infra. 
112 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49, para. 56. 
113 CFI, 7 June 2004, case T-338/02 (order), Segi and others, ECR, p. II-1647, para. 41. 
114 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30; CFI, Kadi, supra note 72. 
115 CFI, Kadi, supra note 72; see in extenso supra. 
116 Opinion ofthe Advocate General, 16 January 2008, case C-402/05 P, Kadi, para. 33; 
see also the Opinion of the Advocate General, 23 January 2008, case C-415/05 P, Al Barakaat 
International Foundation. 
117 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30, para. 316, 281-284. 
118 lbid., para. 281. 
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Court'sjurisdiction was a matter of the internal and autonomous legal order of the 
Community 119• According to the Court, it is only the international agreement itself 
that is out of reach for a control by the Community judicature but not the EC act 
adopting the international rule 120• 
Tue primacy ofthe UN-Resolution in the international dimension would, in the 
Court's view, not be challenged by the review ofthe adoption ofthe Community act 
with regard to its compatibility with the supranational legal order 121• 
The immunity from jurisdiction in favour of Community measures adopting UN-
Resolutions stated as a principle by the CFI was neither demanded by UN- nor by 
EU/EC-law: 
When drawing up supranational measures because of a UN-Resolution, the 
Community had merely to "take due account" of the terms and objectives of the 
UN Resolution and the pertinent UN-Charter obligations for the case of such an 
implementation 122• "Account" must also be taken of the UN Resolution for the 
interpretation of the implementing Community act 123 • 
Articles 307 and 297 EC cannot be used in order to depart from the principles of 
liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental rights pursuant 
to Article 6(1) EU 124• A possible primacy ofUN-law according to Article 300(7) 
EC did on no account affect the primary law ofthe Community 125• 
In addition, also the ECourtHR did not follow the CFI's jus cogens-approach in 
its case law 126• 
Finally, in the Court's view, the developments on the UN-level to change the 
position oflisted people for the better cannot lead to a generalised immunity as applied 
by the CFI 127, since especially the de-listing procedure lingered tobe diplomatic and 
intergovernmental and clearly did not offer the guarantees of judicial protection 128 
b. Violation of fundamental rights 
After having asserted that, as a matter of fact, it had the competence to fully 
review the pertinent Regulation no. 881/2002, the ECJ put this enactment to the test 
of the human rights of the Community. 
119 lbid.,para.317. 
120 lbid., para. 286. 
121 lbid., para. 288. 
122 Jbid., para. 296. 
123 lbid., para. 297. 
124 lbid., para. 303. 
125 lbid., para. 307-308. 
116 lbid., para. 313; the ECJ referred explicitly to the ECourtHR's judgement Bosphorus 
Hava Yollarz Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim (firketi v. lreland, 30 June 2005, Reports of Judgements 
and Decisions 2005-VI, see for this judgement infra. 
127 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30, para. 321. 
128 lbid., para. 322; nota, however, that it remains at least slightly unclear to which stage 
of development on the UN-level exactly the ECJ refers, see also para. 320, 321, 323-325 ofthe 
mentioned judgement. 
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Right tobe heard: The ECJ firstly stated a violation ofthe right tobe heard, since 
the Comnmnity authority in question had omitted to communicate the grounds 
for the listing to the appUcant. Admittedly, there was no obUgation to inform or 
hear the person to be Usted ex ante, scilicet before the actual Usting, since this 
mightjeopardise the effectiveness oftargeted sanction, which is dependent upon 
a certain surprise effect 129• 
However, the relevant information has, according to the Court, to be provided at 
the latest as quickly as possible after the listing by the EC-Regulation adopting the 
UN-Resolution 130• Such a statement ofreasons was vital for the listed people in order 
to defend their rights and be able to decide whether they want to take legal action 
on the commrinity level. And provided they do so, it is only with such information 
that the Community judicature can attend its duty to control the lawfulness of the 
contested Community act rn. 
Without relevance for the present case, the ECJ declared that overriding 
considerations that have to do with safety or the conduct of the international relations 
ofthe Community and ofits Members can have an influence on the communication of 
information to the Usted person 132• 
Right to an effective legal remedy: Secondly, the ECJ answered in the affirmative 
the alleged violation of the right to an effective legal remedy due to the 
impossibility to take legal action against the Usting when not being informed 
on its reasons. Under the present circumstances, the Court did not feel able to 
undertake the review of the contested Regulation 133 • Furthermore, there were 
no overriding considerations that had to do with safety or the conduct of the 
international relations of the Community and its Members which could bring 
about a total exclusion ofthe review by the Communityjudicature 134• However, 
although in casu this aspect was not relevant, the Community judicature must 
be able to consider legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of 
information taken into account before the adoption ofthe Regulation 135• 
Right to respect for property: Finally, according to the Court, there had been a 
breach of the right to respect for property with regard to a procedural aspect of 
the guarantee: Tue pertinent procedures had to provide the person concerned with 
a reasonable opportunity ofputting the own case to the competent authorities 136• 
The relevant Regulation lacks such a possibility which constitutes - given also the 
significance ofthe restriction ofthe property rights with regard to the generality 
129 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30, para. 338-341. 
130 Jbid., para. 336. 
n, Ibid., para. 337. 
132 Jbid., para. 342 and 344. 
n3 lbid., para. 351. 
n4 Ibid., para. 34 3. 
135 Jbid., para. 344, the judgement tal.ks about accordant "techniques". 
n5 Jbid., para. 368. 
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of its application and the actual continuation - a violation of the applicant's right 
to property 137• 
c. Contra! of the legal basis of Regulation no. 881/2002 
The ECJ accepted Articles 61, 301 and 308 EC as a su:fficient legal basis for the 
enactment ofRegulation 881/2002 - but differed with regard to the motivation from 
the analogue parts ofthe CFI'sjudgement 138 • 
d. The position of third individuals ajfected by a listing 
The origin of the first pertinent case discussed in this context, the Möllendorf/ 
Mölledorf-Niehuus-matter 139, was a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 230 EC 
conceming a failed sale of land and buildings due to the fact that the buyer was listed 
in the annex ofRegulation no. 881/2002, which forbids in itsArticle 2(3) the provision 
of economic resources to listed people. Since the buyer was not able to acquire the 
ownership, the sellers were - according to German law - obliged to repay the already 
paid sale price to the buyer. 
The Court could not detect a violation ofthe applicants' - namely the sellers' -
right to property. In its view, the reason of the alleged violation was not Regulation 
8 81/2002, but the indirect effects of the German obligation ofrepayment on non-listed 
people. This constituted a question concerning the domestic law which cannot be 
answered in a preliminary ruling 140 
2. European listings 
a. Access to documents of the institutions 
In an appeal in the Sison-matter 141 against a CFI judgement 142, the ECJ had to 
deal with the claim of an applicant ask:ing for the annulrnent of three Decisions of 
the Council. The Council refused access to the documents which had served as the 
basis for the Council's Decision to add the applicant's name to the list of sanctioned 
people according to Regulation no. 2580/2001. At the beginning ofthe matter stood 
an application for access according to Regulation no. 1049/2001 which had been 
rejected by the Council. 
In the Court's view, the Council enjoys a wide discretion for the decision; it may 
refuse access to a document according to Article 4(1) (a) of Regulation 1049/2001. 
Therefore, this decision could only be reviewed by a court in a restricted way, scilicet 
the procedural rules, the duty to state reasons, the accurate statement of facts and 
manifest errors or misuse of powers 143 
137 Jbid., para. 369. 
138 Jbid., para. 163-236. 
139 ECJ, 11 October 2007, case C-117/06, Möllendorj!Mölledorf-Niehuus, ECR, 
p. I-8361. 
140 ECJ, Möllendorj!Mölledorf-Niehuus, supra note 139, para. 76-77. 
141 ECJ, 1 February 2007, case C-266/05 P, Sison, p. I-1233. 
142 CFI, 26 April 2005, joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, Sison, ECR, 
p. II-1429. 
143 ECJ, Sison, supra note 141, para. 34. 
i 
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When the applicant's argument uses consideration of his specific interest in the 
knowledge of the documents, the Court states, that the purpose of Regulation no. 
1049/2001 was to provide access to the documents of the institutions and not to protect 
the particular interest of a specific individual 144. 
Even if there was a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation 
leading to the listing, one would not be able to exercise this right by using the 
instruments provided by Regulation no. 1049/2001 145 • 
Tue Court also rejected the alleged violation of the right to an effective legal 
remedy against the violation of the pretended right to be informed in detail of the 
accusation: if it is impossible to use Regulation no. 1049/2001 to execute such a 
guarantee, a decision refusing access according to the Regulation cannot be the reason 
for the breach ofthat right 146• 
The brevity of the Council's refusal to access the relevant documents was in 
accordance with the duty to state reasons (Article 253 EC). The statement of reasons 
must be appropriate to the act in casu. The sensitive interests justifying exceptions to 
the right of access must not be undermined by the release of information which should 
be protected by the exception. 
The alleged violation of the presumption of innocence of the listing was rejected 
by the ECJ as being inadmissible, since it had not been raised before the CFI 147• 
On the whole, the appeal was dismissed. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that the CFI stated in the appealed judgement 
in the present matter that it had denied the access only due to a consideration of 
Regulation 1949/2001. Tue question, whether the documents were necessary to the 
defence of the applicant, was a separate matter which could not be decided in the 
presentjudgement 148• We will see ifthe CFI will answer this question in the cases 
OMPI II (T-256/07), Sison II (T-341/07), Al-Aqsa II (T- 276/08). 
b. The position of third individuals ajfected by a listing 149 
In its Osman Ocalan judgement 150, the ECJ had to decide on the First Court's 
strict interpretation of Article 230(4) EC, refusing the non-listed Kurdistan National 
Congreis (KNK) to contest the listing of the dissoluted Kurdistan Workers' Party 
(PKK) by Council's Decision 2002/334 due to a lack of individual concern. Tue 
applicants submitted that the interpretation had to be extended when dealing with 
fundamental rights of the ECHR. 
144 lbid., para. 43. 
145 ECJ, Sison, supra note 49, para. 48. 
146 lbid., para. 80. 
147 lbid., para. 80. 
148 CFI, 26April 2005,joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03, T-405/03, Sison, ECR, p. II-1429, 
para. 55, appeal C-266/05. 
149 This issue needs to be distinguished frorn the position of banks and companies. See in 
this context F. MEYER and J. MAcKE, op. cit., p. 457-465. 
150 ECJ, 28 January 2007, case C-229/05, Osman Ocalan, p. 1-439. 
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The Court rejected the appeal and affirrned its well known Plaumann-fonnula 151 : 
In the Court's view, the KNK does not fall within the scope of this definition, 
since the risk of having one's :funds frozen was rooted in an objectively defined 
prohibition applying to all people under Community law and not conceming the KNK 
individually 152• The ECJ finally rejected the alleged violation of the ECHR by the 
application of the Plaumann formula in casu, because, according to the pertinent case 
law ofthe ECourtHR, the applicant would not be able to bring an action before that 
court: In the context of future violations, the latter recognized the status as a victim 
within the meaning of Article 34 ECHR only in highly exceptional circumstances, 
which were not realized in the present matter 153 • 
On the other hand, the CFI has made clear that a listed person is directly and 
individually concemed in the sense of Article 230( 4) EC 154• 
c. Judicial protection against the Usting by Common Positions 155 
The ECJ already had to deal with claims conceming a violation of the right 
to effective judicial protection under Article 6(2) EU in the context of Common 
Positions. In the cases Gestoras Pro Amnistia and Segi 156, the applicants submitted 
that there was no possibility of challenging the listing of their names in Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSPenacted pursuant to Article 34 (2)(a) EU. 
The ECJ pointed out that Article 35 EU confers no jurisdiction on the Court to 
decide on actions for damages under Title VI of the mentioned Treaty 157• 
Subsequently, the Court rejected an alleged breach of the right of effective judicial 
protection. Basically, a Common Position was not supposed to have legal effects on 
third parties. However, Article 35(1) EU conceming the preliminary rulings needed to 
be given an extensive interpretation: lt referred to all measures adopted by the Council 
intended to have legal effects on third parties - unaffected by their nature and form. 
Therefore, provided a Common Position had exceptional effects on third parties, it 
would be possible to ask the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling. The Court would then 
examine whether the Common Position should indeed produce legal effects to third 
parties and classify it correctly. These principles could also be applied to Article 35(6) 
m "Natural or legal persons can claim tobe concemed individually by a measure of general 
application only if they are affected by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them 
or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from any other person" (ECJ, 
Ocalan, supra note 150, para. 72); initial of first narned after the ECJ judgement, Plaumann, 
case 25/62, ECR [1963], p. 211 (238). 
152 ECJ, Ocalan, supra note 150, para. 73. 
153 Jbid., para. 80, 82. 
154 CFI, Yusuf, supra note 72, para. 186; Ayadi, supra note 83, para. 81. 
155 See for the CFI, supra. 
156 ECJ, 27 February 2007, case C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistia and others, ECR, 
p. I-1579; Segi and others, supra note 113. 
157 ECJ, Gestoras Pro Amnistia and others, supra note 156, para. 46; Segi and others, 
supra note 113, para. 46. 
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EU 158• On the whole, due to the existence ofthese two remedies mentioned, the ECJ 
could not detect a disregard für the right to effective judicial protection. 
C. Judgements of other fora 
1. Swiss Bundesgericht 
In its leading case conceming Youssef Nada ( dated November 2007 159) the 
highest national court of Switzerland füund itself con:fronted für the first time with a 
listed person's plea tobe withdrawn :from the Swiss decree implementing the list of 
the Sanctions Committee according to Resolutions 1267 and 1333. 
After having adopted the UN-sanctions regime autonomously, Switzerland 
became a member of the UN in 2002 and was hencefürth bound by its Resolutions 
like the EC-Member States. 
Referring to the pertinent case law of the CFI, scilicet the cases Yusuf 160 and 
Kadi 161 and the Bosphorus judgement ofthe ECHR 162, the Bundesgericht declared 
itselfbound to the list established by the Sanctions Committee. 
The Articles 25, 48(2) and 103 of the UN-Charter stated an absolute primacy 
in favour of the Charter and the obligations imposed on the Member States by the 
Security Council towards both domestic and international law. The only exception to 
be made referred to the jus cogens, which must not be infringed upon by UN-sanctions; 
the jus cogens was therefüre the only standard according to which the Bundesgericht 
is allowed to control the UN-sanctions. 
Subsequently, the court could not detect a violation: The procedural guarantees 
mentioned by the applicant, i. e. the right to be heard and to a fair trial according to 
Articles 6(1) ECHR and 14(1) ICCPR and the rightto an effective remedy pursuantto 
Articles 13 and 2(3) ICCPR did not belong to the circle ofjus cogens-guarantees. One 
could not detect a consensus throughout the States to recognize binding procedural 
guarantees in favour ofthe individual set on an anti terror-list. 
The Bundesgericht pointed out, that the procedure of listing and de-listing has 
been improved in 2006, a development which could be seen as a crucial progress 
compared to the situation befüre. 
Although these improvements had not abolished several severe defi.ciencies 
related to the fundamental rights, the fact that there is no guarantee in the rank of jus 
cogens being violated leads to the conclusion that the Bundesgericht is not allowed 
to examine the domestic rules which implement the UN-sanctions system without 
domestic discretion. 
Nevertheless, the primacy of the UN-sanctions did not deprive the Swiss authorities 
of all responsibilities: Tue exceptions in the Swiss implementation act must- as far as 
158 ECJ, Gestoras Pro Amnistia and others, supra note 156, para. 52-55; ECJ, Segi and 
others, supra note 113, para. 52-55. 
159 Swiss Bundesgericht (judgement), BGE 133 II 450, 14 November 2007: http://www. 
bger.ch/index/juridiction/jurisdiction-inherit-template/jurisdiction-recht/jurisdiction-recht-
leitentscheidel954.htm (checked 29 February 2008). 
1" See supra note 72. 
161 See ibid. 
162 ECourtHR, Bosphorus, supra note 126. 
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the supreme UN-law allows it- be interpreted in harmony with the Swiss constitution 
( verfassungskonforme Auslegung). 
2. Hause of Lords 
In the current Al-Jedda-matter 163, the House of Lords had the opportunity to 
express its view regarding the relationship between UN-law and the ECHR. The 
pertinent case referred to a terror suspect being held by UK forces in Iraq without 
charge or court access and who alleged a violation of Article 5 ECHR. 
The House ofLords stated that the UN-Charter (in particular its Articles 103, 25 
and 2) and UN Resolutions 1511 (2003), 1546 (2004), 1637 (2005) and 1723 (2006) 
imposed an obligation on UK to detain the appellant, which displaces the guarantees 
enshrined by Article 5 ECHR. Thus, the UK may lawfully, where it is necessary 
for imperative reasons of security, exercise the power to detain according to UN 
Resolution 1546. However, the detainee's rights must not be infiinged upon to any 
greater extent than is inherent in such detention. 
3. ECourtHR 
In a decision, the ECourtHR declared inadmissible an application 164 in which 
two associations alleged violations of the ECHR due to a listing pursuant to Common 
Position 2001/931 in combination with Regulation 2580/2001. The applicants were 
named in the annex to the mentioned Common Position; however, only referring to 
Article 4 of the mentioned Common Position. 
In the Court's view, the applicants in casu are not victims in the sense of Article 
34 ECHR, because they only fall within the scope of Article 4 of the Common 
Position. This provision stated an obligation for the Member States conceming police 
and judicial cooperation which was not directed at individuals. Tue parties were 
only affected by the improved cooperation between Member States. Therefore, the 
applicants lacked the status as victims according to the ECHR 165• The listing may be 
embarrassing, but in the Court's view, the link is much too tenuous. 
In addition, the Court stated in an obiter dictum 166 that even if the applicants 
were affected by a füll application ofthe sanctions, which is not given in the present 
case, they could still apply to the ECJ. 
163 House of Lords [ opinions of the lords of appeal for judgement in the cause R ( on 
the application ofAl-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary ofState for Defence (Respondent)], 
12 December 2007, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd071212/ 
jedda.pdf(checked29 February 2008), para. 26, 39. 
164 ECourtHR, Segi and Gestoras Pro Arnnistia and others v. Gerrnany and others 
Gudgement), nos. 6422/02 and 9916/02, 16 and 23 May 2002, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp 197 /view.asp?item= 1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=segi&sessionid=5859372&s 
kin=hudoc-fr ( checked 29 February 2008). 
165 This part ofthe judgement is also cited in ECJ, Ocalan, supra note 150, para. 80. 
166 S. STEINBARTH, "Individualrechtsschutz gegen Massnahmen der EG zur Bekämpfung 
des internationalen Terrorismus", ZEuS, 2, 2006, p. 269, p. 271-272. 
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4. Caught in a dilemma 
The issue of effective judicial control in a rnulti-layered, interdependent legal 
frarnework with independent courts, exercising control according to their respective 
legal sub-systerns is at the heart ofthe European and national courts deciding in cases 
of terrorist listings. 
A. The ECJ's Kadijudgement 167: Mission not yet accomplished 
lt goes without saying that for the Cornrnunity level with its Kadi judgernent 168 
the ECJ has solved - or at least tried to solve - one of the currently rnost pressing 
problerns in the area of conflict between targeted UN-sanctions, their supranational 
irnplernentation and human rights, scilicet the fact that as soon as it was the UN 
specifying the narnes to be listed, the national and supranational rneasures adopting 
these sanctions were reviewed by the Cornrnunity courts only with regard to their 
cornpliance withjus cogens. Even in the CFI's view 169 it was "irnprobable" that a 
UN-Resolution may in:fringe upon the jus cogens 170. Thus, there was a flarnboyant 
antagonism between the scenario that the UN itself lists names directly in the 
Resolution 171 and the other scenario that the EU/EC decides on the narnes to be 
listed 172• In this second constellation, there suddenly was a far wider protection 
in favour of the listed individual: Both the listing and the de-listing procedure are 
reviewed with regard to the füll guarantees ofthe fundamental rights applicable. lt is 
the CFI's 0-MPI judgernent 173 which has led to several improvernents in favour of 
the fundamental rights ofthe people or entities in the listing and de-listing procedure. 
Tue distinction between a füll protection and one reduced to a little promising 
absolute minirnum was utterly dependent on the rather accidental 174 question of 
which organisation had specified the names to be listed in concreto. With the :ilew 
Kadi judgement 175, this gap seems to have disappeared, since the ECJ claims for 
the Comrnunity courts the competence to review the EU/EC acts implementing UN-
Resolutions with regard to their compliance with the primary law, thus especially the 
Comrnunity's fundamental rights. 
However, the ECJ did not untie the remaining Gordian knot: Tue actual relationship 
between UN-law and the law of the UN-members, including also supranational 
167 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30. 
168 lbid. 
169 CFI, Kadi, supra note 72, para. 230. 
170 L. V AN DEN HEruK, op. cit., p. 798-803, underlines on the other hand that also in the 
situation that the EC draws up the !ist, the CFI "shies away from substantively reviewing the 
listing", considering only the procedural flaws; F. MEYER and J. MAcKE, op. cit., p. 454, detect 
the same approach, however, in their view the CFI considers itself as competent to review 
substantively a !ist in a given case pro faturo. 
171 See for this scenario supra. 
172 See for this scenario supra. 
173 CFI, OMPI, supra note 49. 
174 S. EYMANN, op. cit., p. 250. 
175 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30. 
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enactments, remains fairly dubious. For the moment, explicitly, the ECJ dares only a 
purely introverted approach. 
Nevertheless, there is, indeed, another probable method of resolution hidden in 
the judgement; due to its radicalness the ECJ seems - at the moment - to consider it 
Pandora's Box and has decided not to open it yet. 
lt remains a fact: The UN still cannot be influenced or even controlled "from the 
outside" - even in the new Kadi judgement, the ECJ emphasised that the review of 
lawfulness now required only refers to the Community acts adopting the UN-law but 
not to the latter, which can in no way be controlled by the supranational courts 176• This 
intrinsic control - control only of the Co=unity measures implementing the UN-
requirements with regard to their compliance with the primary law ofthe Co=unity 
- does in the Court's view not challenge the primacy ofthe pertinent UN-Resolution 
in international law 177• Then, it is all the more striking that an organisation of such a 
unique rank does not dispose of suflicient legal protection in favour of those people 
it affects with its measures 178• The question how to obtain a satisfying legal control 
might be seen as one of the currently most virulent issues in international law. 
The explicitly declared approach of the ECJ is thoroughly focussed on the 
Co=unity level: The Co=unity courts can control all Community acts with regard 
to their compliance with ihe Co=unity primary law. This approach complies with 
the well-known standards and is - in this rather autistic dirnension - far from being 
the philosopher's stone. As a result, the reality in the relevant Kadi-matter is slightly 
sobering: The ECJ has decided that the names of the applicants in the Kadi-matter 
shall be maintained for a brief period in the relevant Regulation in order to provide 
the Community authorities with the possibility to deliver ex post a statement and 
remedy for the violation ofthe applicants' fundamental rights 179 • The reasons being 
suflicient, the name will remain on the EU/EC list 180• 
At this point, the Court stops - perhaps because a further elaboration of this 
concept seems to be Pandora's box. The crucial question is: What if the reasons are 
not sufficient? This question is not far-fetched, since it will be quite a heavy task for 
the competent authorities to gather suflicient information considering the fact that 
the relevant inforrnation is furnished by the national intelligence apparatus of the 
UN-members 181• Furtherrnore, the influence ofthe limitation on information which 
can be publicly released according to the authorisation ofthe UN-Member States 182 
is, at the moment, highly dubious in this context. Or, as an alternative, what if the 
176 lbid., para. 286. 
177 Ibid., para. 288. 
178 See e. g. the explicit statements of the ECJ in the Kadi judgement, supra note 30, para. 
322, and ofthe Swiss Bundesgericht, supra note 159, p. 463, also for further discussion. UN 
Resolution 1822 (2008) - whatever its impact will be in praxi - is definitely a change for the 
better, however, it cannot be considered sufficient. 
179 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30, para. 375. 
180 See also supra note 96. 
181 Here, the application of Article 4 UN Resolution 1617 (2005) will prove tobe crucial, 
see supra for the listing procedure on the UN-level. 
182 Article 12 UN Resolution 1822 (2008); see also supra. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FREEZING ORDERS 187 
applicant can prove the reasons given to be false? Is it, in such cases, possible that 
the ECJ eliminates the pertinent name from the Regulation? The judgement, carefully 
following the track ofthe procedural guarantees, where asanatio is still possible, does 
not comment explicitly on these scenarios and how to solve them. 
Supposing names can be withdrawn: How can one go on pretending that the 
European legal control did not have an effect on the underlying UN-Resolution? When 
it comes to names, there is no discretion in favour of the European organs - either they 
list it or not. However, the listing of the pertinent name in all legal systems of the UN-
members is the actual sense of the UN-Resolution. De facto, the Community courts 
would- although they do not admit - control UN-law and if it fails the test, it is not 
transformed and therefore not applied in the Community. 
In our view, despite such concems, there must be a possibility to be withdrawn 
from a European list if the authorities cannot provide sufficient reasons ex post, since 
the statement of reasons would be bare of any meaning if this possibility was out of 
reach. 
Accepting this consequence does not imply that it is the best solution possible. 
Above all dogmatic concems, the main objection against the solution of such an 
intervention of the Community Courts is that it is the quick rebirth of a gap in legal 
protection against targeted sanctions directly after the ECJ had abandoned the CFI's 
jus cogens-limitation. The consequent new approach would not differentiate between 
UN- and European listings - but it could not avoid that the decision conceming the 
scope oflegal protection against targeted sanctiöns will be left to the various national 
and supranational courts. As pointed out, e. g. the Swiss Bundesgericht follows the 
CFI's jus cogens-approach 183 - if it does not change its opinion, it will make an 
enormous difference if one is concemed by an implementing measure of the EU/EC 
or ofSwitzerland, again an untenable consequence. Neither national nor supranational 
courts can abrogate the UN-list de jure and therefore globally-no matter ifthey e. g. 
extend the notion ofjus cogens, disobey applying or annul the national or supranational 
enactrnent adopting the UN-norm 184• In its judgement mentioned above 185, the Swiss 
Bundesgericht cannot detect a sense in a withdrawal from the domestic list while the 
UN-list still contains the pertinent name 186• One always has a fragmentation of legal 
protection. This is the basic dilemma always to be kept in mind when one is looking 
for solutions with regard to a better position of the individual in the context of the 
UN's targeted sanctions. 
m Supra note 159. 
184 See in this context e. g. D. FRANK's elaborate doubts with regard to the total primacy 
ofUN sanctioning UN Resolutions, op. cit., p. 253-255; see also the opinion ofthe Advocate 
General in the Kadi case, supra note 116. 
185 Supra note 159, p. 464. 
186 There lies the essential difference to the CFI's OMPI judgement, supra note 49, where 
there was no UN-list untouched by the judgement. 
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B. Other possible solutions 
1. Intervention by the ECourtHR 
Since the ECourtHR sees in the ECHR a "constitutional instrument of the 
European public order" 187, it is not far-fetched to consider the possibility of a review 
of the UN-Sanctions regime by the judges in Strasbourg. The Court might control 
the UN-law or its European adoption or both with regard to the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the ECHR. 
a. Violation of the ECHR? 
lt is not the aim of this contribution to comment in extenso on the question whether 
a UN-listing is in compliance with the ECHR, but rather to give an impression if and 
how the sanctions can be reviewed at all. 
Nevertheless, it can be added that there seems tobe a consensus that-provided the 
ECourtHR came to füll control - it would state several violations of the ECHR 188 
b. The Bosphorusjudgement 189 
In order tobe able to speculate on a possible future intervention by the ECourtHR, 
one has to consider its mostrecent leading case commenting on the Court's competences 
to review UN-sanctions adopted by the EU/EC. 
The applicants in this case alleged a violation of Article 1 of the First Additional 
Protocol to the ECHR 190 due to the impoundment of a plane which had been leased 
by them. The impoundrnent was based on Article 8 of EC Regulation 820/1993 
which adopts Article 24 UN Resolution 820 (1993) 191 • Tue application was directed 
187 See e. g. Loizidou v. Turkey Gudgement, preliminary objections), no. 15318/89, 
23 March 1995, Series A 310, p. 27-28, para. 75. 
188 S. EYMANN, op. cit., p. 248; D. FRANK, op. cit., p. 241-246; judgement of the Swiss 
Bundesgericht, supra note 159, p. 464; sinceArticle 6 ECHR applies only in the determination 
of"civil rights and obligations" or any "criminal.charge" (see in that context also supra note 22), 
one fustly would have to classify the UN-sanctions from that point of view. The UN's own 
view, that the sanctions were administrative ( see Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Team, 3,a Report, 30 June 2005, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atfi'cfi'%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/1267%20S2005%20572.pdf (checked 29 February), 
para. 39, 41, and preventive [no. 6(c) ofthe Guidelines] is challenged by scholars, see e. g. 
S. EYMANN, op. cit., p. 247-248; D. FRANK, op. cit., p. 243-244; L. VAN DEN HERJK, op. cit., 
p. 806. 
189 ECourtHR, Bosphorus, supra note 126. 
190 Entered into force 18 May 1954; henceforthArticle 1 Protocol no. 1. 
191 The two texts are identical in the relevant parts, see the UN Resolution:"( ... ) decides 
that all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their 
territories in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in 
or Operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" and the 
Regulation: "All vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in which a majority or 
controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the F ederal Republic 
ofYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be impounded by the competent authorities of the 
Member States. ( ... )". 
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against Ireland since it had executed the impoundment according to the mentioned 
enactments. 
The ECourtHR emphasised that the contested impoundment had not been the 
result of discretion by the Irish authorities but by the legal obligations of Ireland 
pursuant to community law. 
Tue Court then saw a legitimate general-interest objective for interference with 
the applicants' possessions in compliance with Community law by a contracting party, 
scilicet Ireland. In the Court's view, it constitutes a legitimate interest of considerable 
weight; the ECHR needed to be interpreted in the light of any relevant rilles and 
principles of international law. "The Court has also long recognized the growing 
importance of international cooperation and the consequent need to secure the proper 
functioning ofinternational organisations" 192• 
Reviewing the link of proportionality between the general interest and the 
impugned interference, the Court summarized its principles in matters like the 
present: 
lt was not contrary to the ECHR to transfer sovereign power to international or 
supranational organisations. 
Tue organisation entrusted with such power could not itself be held responsible 
under the ECHR. 
In contrast, a member of the Council of Europe was responsible according to 
Article 1 ECHR for all acts and omissions of both its organs. This is the case if 
they are a consequence of domestic law or ifthey are necessary to comply with 
international legal obligations. 
Tue national actions taken in order to comply with international or supranational 
obligations were justified "as long as the relevant organisation is considered to 
protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered 
and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be 
considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides" 193 • 
The protection was equivalent if it is comparable. Stricter Requirements could 
run counter to the interest of international cooperation pursued. 
Accordingto the Court, ifsuch an equivalentprotection exists, there is a presumption 
that a state has acted in accordance with the ECHR when only implementing 194 
legal obligations flowing from its membership of an international or supranational 
organisation. However, in cases of manifest deficiencies with regard to the protection 
of the fundamental rights enshrined in ECHR in concreto, the presumption could be 
rebutted in order to enable a review pursuant to the ECHR. The protection being 
manifestly deficient, the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by 
the ECHR's role as a constitutional instrument ofthe European public order. 
The Court then applied these principles to the present matter, first by analysing the 
protection of fundamental rights offered by the EU/EC law: After having underlined 
the evolution offundamental rights on the EU and EC level, also linked to the ECHR 
192 ECourtHR, Bosphorus, supra note 126, para. 150. 
193 ECourtHR, Bosphorus, supra note 126, para. 155. 
194 Without own discretion, see D. FRANK, op. cit., p. 247. 
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and its case law, the Court classi:fied the system of legal remedies provided by the 
TEC 195 as equivalent to the protection offered by the Convention system, so that 
one could presume that Ireland did not infringe upon the ECHR when adapting its 
obligations flowing from its EC-membership. Finally, the Court stated very briefly that 
there had been no dysfunction ofthe mechanisms of control to secure the observance 
of the ECHR-guarantees so that the presumption could not be rebutted. Therefore, 
according to the Court, there had been no violation of Article 1 Protocol no. 1. 
c. Probable approach with regard to a UN-Usting? 
The crucial question is obviously how the criteria described above would be 
applied if a person or entity listed by the Sanctions Committee alleged violations of 
theECHR. 
Firstly, the ECourtHR would have to decide whether the ECJ's review in concreto 
is manifestly de:ficient in order tobe able to rebut the presumption arisen. lt is doubtful 
that after the ECJ's Kadi judgement 196 the ECourtHR might find such a deficiency on 
the EU/EC-level. Thus, the question is virulent rather with regard to States, in which 
the courts still are in favour of the jus cogens-control abandoned by the ECJ, so e. g. in 
Switzerland: The fundamental rights ofthe EU/EC have been classified as equivalent 
by the ECourtHR in its Bosphorus judgement 197• However, is ajus cogens-test also 
an equivalent mechanism controlling the observance ofthose equivalent substantive 
guarantees? 
lt has to be underlined that the situation in the Bosphorus case di:ffers slightly 
from the UN-listings brought before the Bundesgericht 198 (and the CFI) 199• In the 
Bosphorus case the CFI had expressed itself - before the ECourtHR had passed its 
judgement- in a preliminary ruling 200 pursuant to Article 234 EC on the compliance 
of Article 8 Regulation no. 990/93 without limiting its arguments to the control of 
jus cogens 201 • This approach is questionable, as - like in the situation that a UN-
member has to adopt a UN-listing- neither party 202 in the Bosphorus case exercised 
discretion. 
Afortiori, the lack ofthe possibility to obtain a statement not being limited to jus 
cogens could lead to the conclusion of a manifest deficiency in a case concerning an 
alleged breach ofthe ECHR by a UN-listing. 
195 E. g. Artic!es 230, 232, 241, 226-228 and 234 TEC; ECourtHR, Bosphorus, supra note 
126, para. 161-164. 
196 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30. 
197 ECourtHR, Bosphorus, supra note 126, para. 159. 
198 Supra note 159. 
199 CFI, Kadi and Yusuf, supra note 72. 
200 ECJ, 30 June 1996, case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hcrva Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. 
Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and others, ECR, p. I-3953. 
201 Opinion of the Advocate General in the appealed Kadi case, supra note 72, para. 26-
27. 
202 Explicitly ECourtHR Bosphorus, supra note 126, para. 148; D. FRANK, op. cit., p. 248. 
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Secondly, the ECourtHR could comment on the compliance of the UN listing 
and de-listing procedures with the ECHR 203• Obviously, the problems would have 
to be sought in the Sanctions Comrnittee as a "tribunal" in the sense of Article 6(1) 
ECHR and the rights ofthe listed person after his or her listing, especially a de-listing 
procedure in the context of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR 204• 
Finally, it has nevertheless tobe emphasized that the ECourtHR, in its Bosphorus 
judgement 205, does not examine the UN-system-influencing the EU/EC in a binding 
way - with regard to an equivalent protection 206• Such an examination is left out 
silently. 
On the other hand, the ECourtHR never declared itself subordinated to the UN 
in such an explicit way like e. g. the CFI 207 - therefore, the silence in the Bosphorus 
case could also be a chance to have füll control with regard to the ECHR. 
d. A better solution? 
Above all concerns about the feasibility of such a control, one has to underline that 
a review by the ECourtHR could not - just like with regard to an intervention of the 
Community courts - avert a regional ftagmentation of legal protection. Nevertheless, 
a ECourtHR-review could be meaningful in a different context 208 so that the mere 
possibility of such a control is crucial to be stated. 
2. Autonomous acceptance of fundamental standards by the UN 
The UN has recently improved the listing and de-listing procedure with regard to 
respect of fundamental rights by creating the possibility for a listed person to submit 
a request for de-listing directly to the UN through the focal point process and the 
statement of reasons ex post 209• lt could continue in this direction and try to fulfil 
autonomously the requirements stated by essential human rights conventions such as 
the ECHR and the ICCPR 210• 
At the moment, this seems to be the most promising approach in order to reach 
a consistent level of protection of the human rights, which is not ftagmented due 
to different approaches by national and supranational courts. N evertheless, it goes 
without saying that it is also a heavy task, and an expectation that in the intermediate 
term future the UN will dispose of a genuine tribunal in compliance with the highest 
203 Although, obviously, the UN itself cannot be held responsible by the ECourtHR, but 
only the members of the Council of Europe. 
204 Particularly also Article 6 (2) ECHR. 
205 ECourtHR, Bosphorus, supra note 126. 
206 D. FRANK, op. cit., p. 248. 
201 Ibid., p. 253. 
208 See infra. 
209 See for the proceedings supra; the Swiss Bundesgericht qualifies these recent 
developments on p. 463 of the judgement mentioned supra note 159 as "improvements", 
nevertheless, it still states weighty deficiencies with regard to the fundamental rights. Accorcling 
to the ECJ's Kadi judgement, supra note 30, para. 322, the de-listing procedure of the UN 
"clearly" does not "offer the guarantees ofjudicial protection". 
210 See for probable conflicts with the ECHR supra. 
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global standards with regard to human rights is doomed to be nothing more than a 
beautiful illusion. It is even highly doubtful whether the legal protection we know 
today especially in the scope of the ECHR can be "globalized" on the UN-level or 
- as a more obvious approach - if a search for utterly new forms of protection of 
fundamental rights standards will be necessary. 
5. Conclusion 
The ECJ's Kadi judgement may not be the best solution forever- however, for the 
moment, it might be a promising approach if one understands the "yes we can" from 
Luxembourg as a shot across the bow. It is a possibility to show the UN once more 
that there are clear drawbacks with regard to the legal protection against its measures. 
Therefore, one especially has to acclaim that the ECJ - different from the CFI's 
exceedingly careful approach - finds critical words for the existing UN-remedies m _ 
In the combination with the impending Pandora's box of names being withdrawn 
from the Community's list, the ECJ could be able to exert a certain pressure on the 
UN to change its system of legal protection for listed people for the better. In this 
context, the de:ficit of the limited perspective of the ECJ, focussing explicitly only 
on the Community's legal order, is not relevant and perhaps even necessary from the 
dogmatic point ofview. In the nearer future, it would, however; not be far-fetched to 
apply a certain kind of "Solange"-clause ("as long as") 212, in order to attract more 
attention. 
As a national example, also the Swiss Bundesgericht dares to state explicitly that 
the UN-system oflisting and de-listing does not comply with the ECHR 213 • In this 
context, it is valuable to consider an analogue situation in Swiss national law: Article 
190 of the Swiss Constitution states, inter alia, that the Bundesgericht has to apply the 
Bundesgesetze 214 even if they infringe upon the Constitution. Although the highest 
Swiss court follows - in the rare cases that this provision becomes relevant - this 
obligation, it often comments on the fact that the Bundesgesetz infringes upon the 
Constitution in the present matter and urges therefore the Parliament to change the 
Bundesgesetz in accordance with the Constitution 215• In doing so, it can contact the 
legislator in a certain form and give an impulse how to change a situation for the better 
which is in the Court's eyes amendable. 
211 ECJ, Kadi, supra note 30, para. 320-325; see also supra note 128. 
212 Named after the well-known judgements of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
Solange!, 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271, and Solange II, 22 October 1986, BVerfGE 73, 
339; nota by the way that also the ECourtHR used.a similar pattem in its Bosphorus judgement, 
supra note 126. 
213 The House ofLords admits that there is a "clash", too, supra note 163, para. 39. 
214 Enactments by the Parliament - with the possibility of a veto of the Swiss people 
- directed at a general circle of individuals and referring to an abstract situation. 
215 See e. g. Swiss Bundesgericht, 2 February 1977, BGE 103 Ia 53 (55), http://www. 
bger.ch/index/juridiction/jurisdiction-inherit-template/jurisdiction-recht/jurisdiction-recht-
leitentscheidel954.htm (checked 29 February 2008). 
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In this context, a clear statement by the ECourtHR would be a further strong 
signal towards the UN to be taken seriously. lt has been shown 216 that, in theory, 
Strasbourg has the possibility to give this signal, at least towards those States which 
cling to ajus cogens-control. 
But not only the courts, but also the UN-members themselves should push forward 
the necessary development m. 
Such contacts or invitations might, in our view, be the most auspicious approach 
in order to find a way out ofthe dilemma depicted above: The UN-law does not forbid 
national or supranational courts to simply comment on the compliance of adopted UN-
sanctions with the pertinent domestic law. On the contrary, such remarks might be a 
welcome inspiration for the UN to get involved in an open and prolific dialogue with 
the courts ofthe world suggesting improvements, so that the goalofthe UN in adapting 
the human rights standards of its members 218 could be accomplished in a meaningful 
way. The fact that the Preamble ofthe UN-Charter refers to the "fundamental human 
rights" is clearly in accordance with such a dialogue 219• By concealing possible 
collisions, the UN-members do not act in favour of the UN's best interest either 220 
- or by using Llewellyn's dictum: "Covert tools are never reliable tools" 22l. The 
fact that UN Resolution 1822 (2008) refers now explicitly to the problem oflegal 
protection 222 can be seen as an exceedingly welcome affirmation for the efficiency of 
the new frank approach in praxi. 
In all, the national and supranational courts ofthe world cannot solve the problem 
ofthe deficient legal protection on the UN-level directly-it is only the UN that is able 
to draw up a firm and global solution. However, constant vigilance of those courts 
and, in general all UN-members, and the will to use sometimes interim solutions are 
indispensable preconditions for a necessary change to happen in the future, since only 
constant dripping wears away the stone. 
216 See supra. 
217 See e. g. the suggestions in the White Paper prepared by order ofSwitzerland, Germany 
and Sweden by the Watson Institute for International Studies, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions 
Through Fair and Clear Procedures, 2006, http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_ 
Targeted _ Sanctions.pdf ( checked 29 February 2008) and also the recommendations prepared by 
Austria, the UN Security Council and the rule oflaw, 2008, http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadrnin/ 
user _ upload/bmeia/media/Vertretungsbehoerden/New _York/Kandidatur_ SR/FINAL_ Report_-
_ The _UN_ Security _ Council_ and _the _ Rule _ of_Law.pdf (checked 10 October 2008). 
218 Supra. 
219 L. V AN DEN RERIK, op. cit., p. 802-805, considers already the CFI'sjus cogens-control 
for itself contributing to such a dialogue influencing the UN. 
220 Also in the context of a system of collective security, there are questions of checks and 
balances, L. V AN DEN RERIK, op. cit., p. 799. 
221 Harvard Law Review, 52/700, 1939, p. 703. 
222 E. g. Article 28 UN Resolution 1822 (2008). 
